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A B S T R A C T
Ten years after the Global Financial Crisis, this research examines how resilience theory and rhetoric relating to
the economy and housing markets has been translated into policy and practice. The methodology involves a case
study of a city (Auckland) with a nationally dominant housing market and high unaffordability. Via secondary
literature and a series of interviews we analyse questions connected to resilience from what, how, by whom, and
discuss the implications and limits of the approach. The research demonstrates that resilience policies have
focused on providing institutional stability to shock, rather than adaptation or transformation to a state that is
less exposed to the systemic risks associated with flows of global capital, debt, and speculative activity. This is
related to how the whole concept is vaguely defined. In the absence of guidance, institutions reinterpret resi-
lience in a way that underpins existing market and regulatory logics, such as by increasing capital reserves or
lending ratios. As a consequence, the dominant political economy, selected institutions, and to an extent, existing
homeowners and speculative investors are privileged in resilience policy. By bringing these selectivities and
limits to light we argue for a shift in focus away from an institutional frame to one with a deeper understanding
of both the balance of an economy and the wider forces that create and reproduce housing markets.
1. Introduction
The reach and impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) served to
highlight both the critical importance of housing markets for many
national economies and how flows of global finance operate in an
opaque manner beyond the knowledge and reach of much domestic
regulation and legislation. In the aftermath of the crisis it became ap-
parent that the devastating effect of weak regulation in a single country
(the US subprime mortgage market) had rapidly spread, forcing the
implementation of emergency fiscal measures around the world.
Beyond the more noticeable impacts on housing, knock-on effects such
as the restriction of credit and purchasing power led to a global slow-
down with businesses in countries beyond the US losing jobs or filing
for bankruptcy. The connectivity, complexity, and vulnerability of our
economic system was highlighted in a most high profile, and shocking,
fashion (Bristow and Healy, 2015).
Over a decade since the crisis, the economic importance of housing
has grown and the sector continues to attract huge investment. Indeed,
the consistent flow of global finance into national housing markets is
now a key feature of many post-industrial capitalist economies
(Aalbers, 2009, 2016). Consequently, discourse regarding the extent to
which buoyant housing markets are a risk to national economies
appears to be a recurring theme (IMF, 2016). To provide added nuance,
the wider importance of housing means that the risks are diverse, in-
cluding for example, unaffordability and equity concerns (Dorling,
2014; Eaqub and Eaqub, 2015; Murphy, 2016; Piketty, 2015; REAU,
2018; Kuang and Li, 2012). Indeed, cities with high unaffordability are
now ranked annually (Demographia, 2018). The most recent top 10
median multiple unaffordability ratios (median house price divided by
median household income) are Hong Kong (19.4), Sydney (12.9),
Vancouver (12.6), San Jose (10.3), Melbourne (9.9), Los Angeles (9.4),
Honolulu (9.2), San Francisco (9.1), Auckland (8.8), and London (8.5).
As the housing market in many of these cities also plays a dominant role
domestically, we can see how this global economic risk cascades down
to nation states (Austin et al., 2014). However, given that housing plays
multiple roles, from offshore capital investment to the promise of
homeownership, the risks are subjective: depending upon your per-
spective, there may be risk of a crash or risk of a continuation.
In part response to the difficulties in predicting and managing this
multi-scalar risk, the need for regions and nations to be more ‘resilient’
to potential economic shock and stress has begun to permeate discourse
(e.g. Bristow, 2010; Eraydin, 2016; Hudson, 2010). For example, a re-
cent OECD report introduced a set of vulnerability indicators to help
provide warning signs, arguing: ‘the high costs of crises underscore the
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need to strengthen the resilience of economies’ (Röhn et al., 2015: 3).
Encompassing compelling notions of coping, adaptation, and transfor-
mation, resilience has quickly become a key strand of the public policy
lexicon (Chandler and Coaffee, 2016). However, in studies that have
examined its application, there has been concerns raised about its
conceptual ‘slipperyness’ and its ability to deliver substantive change in
its translation from rhetoric to reality (Davoudi, 2012; White and
O’Hare, 2014).
This paper aims to add to this discourse by examining the way re-
silience has been applied as a means to manage risk stemming from an
overheated housing market. While states have some power to shape
markets to be more ‘resilient’, critical questions remain regarding
conceptualisation, implementation, and unevenness; or more simply,
resilience from what, how, and for whom? The risks associated with
housing markets are deeply contextual: we have both a need for sta-
bility and a need for change; fears for nations and fears for individuals.
To analyse this highly contested and political arena we use a case study
to investigate how economic resilience policies are applied in a country
with both a dominant housing market (New Zealand) and a highly
unaffordable city and region (Auckland). We focus on three questions.
(1) How does resilience become translated into real-world practice and
policy to manage the economic risk relating to housing markets? (2)
What are the implications? (3) And how may it be improved?
This research has revealed the following key messages. The appli-
cation of resilience is overwhelmingly focused on increasing economic
stability to external shock, rather than changing the exposure of the
economy to the risk. This is due, in part, to the way that resilience is
implemented and by whom. While resilience in the economy is widely
accepted as an objective, there is no central direction or expert con-
sensus over what that should entail, or how you would know if it was
achieved. In this vacuum resilience practice is largely shaped by long-
standing institutional logics; for example, increasing cash reserves or
tweaking lending ratios. The implications of this are that while the
systemic risks stemming from the housing market are relatively un-
changed, the risks were internally redistributed away from powerful
actors, both within and beyond nations. For example, those who own
homes or invested in the housing market were actually better protected
from the effects of a housing market shock than those who do not.
While on a wider scale, responsibility to cope passes not just from the
state to individuals, as critiqued elsewhere (e.g. Kaika, 2017; Evans and
Reid, 2013), but from large nations to smaller nations where economies
are interconnected.
In raising this critique, we also provide insights for other nations
and cities seeking to use the concept as a policy tool. There is little
doubt that buoyant housing markets have fuelled national economic
growth and, while stability is desirable, without strong central direction
to influence power and agency, systemic risk in the economy is largely
untouched. Put differently, actors and agencies who help shape the
housing market have themselves proved resilient to wider forces for
change. While the power of the state to address this global issue is
limited, they do have the power to shape markets and adjust the bal-
ance of economies and, in doing so, help reduce overall exposure to this
systemic risk. As such, measures beyond stability need to be pursued to
make both an economy, and those most vulnerable, less exposed to this
potential shock.
2. Methods
The research approach involved the use of both secondary and
primary data. Firstly, a desk-based study enabled understanding of re-
silience theory, the problems of implementation, and its specific ap-
plication to the resilience of an economy and its housing market(s).
Second, a case study was used to identify and interrogate key issues in
policy and practice. New Zealand was chosen with the Auckland
housing market being both unaffordable and nationally dominant. For
the purposes of the paper, we define a dominant housing market as one
where the value and number of properties in an urban area has a sig-
nificant and disproportional effect on the national economy. To con-
textualise the situation, in 2017 Auckland had a population of
1,534,700 people, which accounted for 32% of the New Zealand po-
pulation (Statistics, 2017). The regional housing stock rapidly increased
from 506,808 units to 535,000 units in 2017. Of further interest with
respect to the make-up of the housing market is that 195,364 units (or
38.5%) are not owned by occupants (BRANZ, 2017). Furthermore, the
rental stock in 2017 was 216,700, which accounts for 40.5% of the
Auckland regional total (Johnson et al., 2018).
The selected case also sets interesting backdrop, as the nuances of
the New Zealand economy, which was relatively insulated from much
international financial exposure, meant that it fared comparatively well
during the GFC and its aftermath (Murphy, 2011). This raises inter-
esting questions for the country; 10 years on from the GFC, and with all
the hard-earned knowledge that has brought, does the rise in economic
importance of the Auckland housing market mean that New Zealand is
now less resilient? Just how are resilience strategies managing this risk
and with what objectives?
The primary data collection was conducted during 2017-18. Key
institutions were selected and a snowball technique used to develop a
comprehensive list (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). A range of professions
and roles were interviewed due to their in-depth understanding on re-
silience in the economy, the housing market in Auckland, and its role in
the New Zealand economy. Professions ranged from policy makers, fi-
nanciers, investors, authorities (national, regional, municipal), plan-
ners, developers, consultants and academics. Roles ranged from Muni-
cipal Development Directors, Housing Consultancy CEOs, Municipal
Chief Economists, Infrastructure Council Executives, Economic Devel-
opment Directors, Private Developer Executives, Senior Treasury Offi-
cials, Professors, and Senior Central Government Department Officials.
To help understand the national and city level context we also reviewed
a series of grey literature relating to resilience in the economy, such as
consultant reports, research centre reports, and various policy briefs.
The method of investigation was predicated upon a deductive pro-
cess whereby 20 formal and informal interviews were undertaken. The
results of which fed into the analysis and further questioning of other
participants in the study (Mason, 2017). The semi-structured lines of
questioning were designed to provide an understanding of the resilience
of New Zealand to economic shocks emanating from the housing
market. It was important at a broad level to bring out respondent
thoughts as to what resilience in the economy means, how it is enabled,
and the associated role that housing markets and unaffordability have
in this respect. This fieldwork was synthesized and triangulated with
the desk study aspects. Collation and analysis of data was further en-
hanced by categorizing key issues and themes that emerged, with re-
levant quotes highlighted to evidence the narrative. While interviewee
names were anonymized in line with ethical conventions, the institu-
tions detailed in Table 1 provide an insight into the breadth of the
discussions.
3. The contested interpretation and application of economic
resilience
This section is designed to provide the foundation to analyse issues
connected to risk stemming from the Auckland housing market, and the
ways policy and practice engage with resilience in response. The con-
cept of resilience is often conceived as an aspirational ‘good’ to help
manage the turbulence, shocks and stresses that characterize much of
the 21st century society (Amin, 2013; Klein, 2007). It is argued that
society now appears to live in a permanent state of economic, en-
vironmental and social emergency (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014)
with risk increasingly normalised (Beck, 2009; Giddens, 1991). Rooted
in complex systems thinking, the notion is essentially an organising
concept to help govern complexity and uncertainty across multiple
public policy concerns (Chandler, 2014; Chandler and Coaffee, 2016;
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Paidakaki and Moulaert, 2017; Evans and Reid, 2013). It has an in-
herent anticipatory logic that suggests current action in order to
manage intangible future threats (Anderson, 2010).
There is a significant and growing body of literature concerning the
field of resilience, but issues connected to its conceptualisation and
application are of particular note here. Initially, resilience was designed
as a means to cope with, or absorb, shock; to return to normality and
promote stability of function (Holling, 1973). More recent articulations
highlight how resilience can also link to the pathways or adaptation
agendas, where rather than try to simply cope with turbulence, systems
should adapt or even transition to a new state that is less exposed and
vulnerable to risk (O’Hare et al., 2016). While there are important
differences, in reality both stability and change can be desirable char-
acteristics in the context of a wider complex system (Wilkinson, 2012).
These conceptual distinctions are important: a number of authors
highlight how the definitional ambiguity of the concept has issues for
application (e.g. Brand and Jax, 2007; Davoudi, 2012), in particular
with regard to enabling the more politically challenging transformative
aspects. For instance, in an analysis that traced the use of resilience
from policy to practice in spatial planning, White and O’Hare (2014)
demonstrated how resilience tended to be characterised by a simple
return to normality that is more analogous with existing ways of
knowing and doing, dominant interests, and techno-managerial trends.
In a related fashion, in appearing to normalize risk by putting a focus on
‘resilience’ in response, the concept has been subject to persistent cri-
tique, such as by contributing to a governmentality that allocates re-
sponsibility for dealing with shocks onto the governed, who may be
poorly equipped to do so (Joseph, 2016; Kaika, 2017). These arguments
highlight how power and agency may transform a vague politically
compelling notion to mirror dominant ontologies or practices (Joseph,
2013; Collier, 2014; Meerow and Newell, 2016). This political economy
critique provides an effective means to foreground the links between
resilience as a concept and its ability to influence housing markets in
practice.
It is clear that post GFC, resilience has been gradually adopted on a
political and institutional level as a concept to help manage economic
shocks (Cote and Nightingale, 2012; Hermansen and Röhn, 2015). For
instance, a search of ‘resilience’ on the International Monetary Fund
website reveals it was found in 7450 documents in June 2018. An
emphasis on providing an internal response to manage an uncertain
external risk underpins much focus and strengthens the argument that
the dominance of capital accumulation practices means that economic
risk is now systemic (Harvey, 2011; Brenner et al., 2012; Peck, 2010).
Significantly, this risk is difficult to manage, however. Capital can flow
instantaneously between nodes of global activity, while technological
and financial innovations can rapidly change the way markets and in-
stitutions operate (Balland et al., 2015). In this challenging context,
domestic governance and regulatory structures do not just struggle to
‘keep pace’, but have their limits and boundaries exposed. It also helps
reveal why resilience is seen as a desirable governance characteristic;
advanced nations are rendered vulnerable to risk by fundamental
structural aspects, such as the connectedness of capital and societies
(Beck, 2009; Castells, 2011).
A further element relating to managing economic resilience is evi-
dence of persistent neoliberal deregulatory pressures, which are visible
almost regardless of risks. For instance, when analysing the interna-
tional response to the GFC it was found that a recurring argument was
the need for less, not more, regulation (Brakman et al., 2015; Martin,
2012). The period of austerity that followed in many countries provides
a good example, where arguments concerning lower government
spending, ‘freer’ markets, and a lessening of ‘red-tape’ for business were
commonplace. Yet, state intervention did tend to occur in specific areas,
particularly those centred on maintaining stability and hegemony of the
prevailing financial system, such as by bailing out the banks that were
seen as ‘too big to fail’. This type of response is usefully described as the
tendency for neoliberal politics to ‘fail forward’ – where failures tend to
engender new experimentations around what are essentially very si-
milar market-oriented ideologies (Peck, 2010). Or drawing on resi-
lience theory, resilience as economic stability and recovery appeared to
be prioritized over economic adaptation and transformation; neoliberal
ideology was itself proving ‘resilient’ to forces of change. This per-
spective emphasises the importance of situating institutional practices
designed to influence economic resilience, such as by government de-
partments or regulators, within the wider political economy that frames
risks.
To add further nuance, we can turn attention to the complex nature
of housing markets. It is important to note that markets are not just
neutral resource allocation mechanisms, but are actively created and
reproduced by actors and institutions (Callon, 1998). With regard to
housing there are actually multiple intersecting markets (e.g. financial,
land, mortgages) within which a variety of strategies, practices, and
risks combine to form housing markets that differ spatially. Research
focused on housing also shows how external pressures to change, such
as technological ‘solutions’ or policy ‘fixes’, can be resisted and fail to
disrupt decision making heuristics or processes (Adams et al., 2009,
2012; Lovell and Smith, 2010; Çalışkan, and Callon, 2009, 2010). Po-
licies aimed at reshaping housing markets to increase economic resi-
lience therefore should be considered as part of a complex assemblage
that will resist, react, and redistribute.
Given the economic risks associated with housing markets, research
is beginning to consider the structures, interconnections and trade-offs
inherent in this agenda. While resilience is not a central theme, Murphy
(2011) and Lowe (2017) both consider the macroeconomic, institu-
tional, and policy conditions that help shelter Australian and New
Zealand housing markets from the GFC. They similarly argue that while
these markets were able to avoid significant impacts, rising capital
growth and household debt present ongoing risks. In other research that
examines economic risks in the sector, Fraser et al (2008) explored the
New Zealand house price bubble between 1970 and 2005. They high-
light the high dominance of the residential asset class over an extended
period prior to the GFC in a way that predicates the current resilience
challenges. Van der Heijden et al. (2011) also discuss the variable
nature of housing markets. They argue that in a Western European
context, countries whose markets were more exposed to private capital
were more vulnerable to the GFC (English, Irish, the Netherlands), than
those who were not (Germany and Belgium). This provides an inter-
esting insight into possible strategies to become more resilient to eco-
nomic shocks of this nature. The role of the housing market as part of
the wider economy should therefore be a key part of the resilience
discussion.
At this scale, however, we see spatial and temporal trade-offs
quickly emerge. For example, while agglomerations of industry can
provide a spur to economic growth, over the longer-term the lack of
diversity can make regions vulnerable to employment shock (Brown
Table 1
Institutions that contributed to the primary data collection.
Institutions
Panuku Development Auckland Law and Economics Association
New Zealand
Auckland Tourism Events and Economic
Development
Auckland University of Technology
Auckland City Council The Property Foundation
Pacific Rim Real Estate Society New Zealand Property Investors
Federation
Hamilton Developers Forum Auckland University
Colliers International Sense Partners
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
(RICS)
Infrastructure New Zealand
Treasury, NZ Massey University
New Ground Capital Property Institute of New Zealand
Treasury, NZ Waikato University
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and Greenbaum, 2017). Similarly, while a dominant housing market, or
climbing the ‘housing ladder’ can increase exposure to risk (Pareja-
Eastaway and Sánchez-Martínez, 2017), it can also boost personal
wealth and wider economic growth through enabling private con-
sumption and residential construction (Catte et al., 2005). In a related
fashion, high exports may mean your economy is adaptive (Pickles and
Smith, 2011), but you are consequently more exposed to the vagaries of
the global economy. Other research highlights how the balance of re-
gional economies and the nature of urbanisation plays a role in resi-
lience. A large EU study into the effects of the GFC by Brakman et al.
(2015) showed that regions with a large proportion of commuters, or
who had a significant share of high tech industries, fared comparatively
better than others. Providing a slightly different spin, the least resilient
regions in Spain to the effects of the GFC were those with a high pro-
portion of construction and manufacturing, while the most resilient
were those economies that had specialised in energy, business, and
professional services (Cuadrado-Roura and Maroto, 2016). A further
example of the differences between regions is provided by Antoniucci
and Marella (2016) who demonstrate that while increasing housing
supply via intensification practices in urban areas provides economic
benefits to a city, housing markets in less dense cities proved to be more
resilient than denser cities during a recession.
This direction of discussion emphasises that institutionally-driven
economic resilience objectives may be in competition between sectors,
scales, or times (Bristow, 2010). As such, there are political selectivities
that shape what the risk is, to whom, and how resilience policies may
shape markets in response. For instance, do you promote policies that
focus on increasing the wealth nations and individuals have to cope
with shocks, even while systemic risk is increased? Or should you raise
interest rates to cool an overheating housing market, which while ef-
fective in one city, will reduce disposable income and economic growth
on a national scale?
A further element of interest for our discussion of resilience con-
cerns operational choices and the possibilities of quantifying risks. For
example, Greenhalgh and King (2013) suggest housing market shaping
ideas in terms of measuring markets, using property market filtering
and chaining techniques, and developing indicators of property market
resilience using VAT registration and Rateable Value datasets. Simi-
larly, Röhn et al. (2015) develop a set of resilience and vulnerability
indicators that include asset market imbalances. Dinh and Pearson
(2015) explore housing operations more from a community economic
resilience framework of measurement, within which ‘softer’ factors af-
fecting housing market resilience are recognised. Metrics in resilience
continue as a theme for Dubé and PolèSe (2016) when they consider
core factors influencing the demand side of housing via population,
employment, unemployment and employment rates. While, there is a
managerial pragmatism at play, the operational and stability oriented
definition of ‘resilience’ remains problematic, siloed and reactive due to
the difficulty in excluding the many ‘players’ that may not appear in the
measures (e.g. Gibb et al., 2016). It also puts the focus squarely on
internal institutional responses as a means to cope with dynamic sys-
temic risks.
This section has served to link resilience as a theory, with its com-
plex interpretation and application in the context of an economy and
housing markets. As a means to organise complex systems and cope
with shock and stress, resilience thinking clearly has applicability to the
economy and housing markets, such as a means to provide a new lens or
policy narrative (Scott and Gkartzios, 2014), or the way it highlights
the need to foster positive characteristics in the face of inevitable major
or minor disruptions (Martin, 2012). While there is potential to influ-
ence the risk from housing markets, we can appreciate that policy and
regulatory tensions and economic trade-offs may occur between na-
tional, regional, and individual resilience, short-term and long term
resilience, or even between housing markets and other aspects of the
economy. Given this context, we can see that economic risks and the
need for resilience are dynamic: the risk is sometimes macro-economic;
sometimes regional and specific; sometimes relating to housing or in-
dustry. That said, it is important to note that there is significant con-
nectivity with regional and institutional issues also influence housing
markets. For example, investment in cities or regions can drive housing
demand, while fiscal contraction can stimulate labour to move else-
where. Consequently, much of the material serves to underscore the
hidden political nature of economic resilience, where policy or reg-
ulation can have a zero sum nature that may alternatively strengthen or
weaken dependent upon the desired objective, scale, or time frame.
We will now turn our attention to the empirical aspects of the study
to examine more deeply the links between resilience, the Auckland
housing market as representing a national risk, and the implications of
current policy and practice.
4. Unpacking the perception of economic risk
Findings focus on two core themes that, first, unpack how dominant
housing markets and their policies affect the resilience of an economy,
and second uncover who is attempting to shape resilience to housing
market shocks. Overall, there was broad agreement on the need to
pursue policies that make the Auckland housing market more resilient
for the benefit of the New Zealand economy. For instance, the ex-New
Zealand Prime Minister, Bill English (2015), underscored the funda-
mental links between resilience, the economy and the Auckland
housing market stating:
“The Government takes the approach that the best thing we can do
for the economy is work to improve its resilience–its capacity to
adapt… The most evident indication of a problem is Auckland house
prices…Because it's a large asset on the New Zealand balance sheet,
worth around $600 billion. And because what happens in our
housing markets has a profound effect on every household”.
When interrogating the question of what is the key economic risk to
be resilient to, the dependence of the national economy on the housing
market was repeatedly put forward. One interviewee exemplifies this
point in that:
“Clearly the economy is very dependent on it [Housing Market]. If
there is some kind of shock to the housing market, it will inevitably
have an impact on the Auckland economy and it will have an impact
on the national economy” (Senior Consultant B).
There was also broad agreement on the risks that the Auckland
housing market is exposed to at a national and global scale. During the
last GFC the New Zealand economy was protected by dominant
Australian banks, who were not as intertwined with international fi-
nancial markets as the European banks (e.g. Murphy, 2011). This in-
sight into the international economic links provided some of the un-
derlying rationale of the need for resilience. In this respect New Zealand
economic risk was seen to be dependent upon matters largely outside
their control, namely the Australian institutional and regulatory per-
ceptions of economic risk and resilience, their associated good practice,
and the nuances of their economic cycle. One interviewee explains New
Zealand’s exposure in the housing market, stating:
“…therein lies to me a concern because really, it’s outside the
control of New Zealand. To me it’s much more at the discretion of
the Australian regulatory environment. Whatever changes or
whatever they do they can have an impact as to what’s going to
happen. To me that’s the biggest risk I think the whole thing faces”
(Economic Development Executive).
However, there was general, although not unanimous, agreement
that New Zealand was more resilient than the last GFC. On the plus side,
there has been a significant increase in institutional information con-
cerning financial risks and regulatory awareness of risky practices, but
this occurs within the individualised context of highly leveraged people
benefitting from historically low interest rates. Here we see two key
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quotes that underscore the importance of discussing resilience for
whom and how. We have a perception of a more resilient economy due
to tighter regulatory control, set against a potentially less resilient
housing market due to the high debt of many market participants:
“Certainly from a regulatory perspective, you must conclude that we
are more resilient than we were. The Reserve Bank, in my view,
dropped the ball on those finance companies. They didn't monitor
them at all, basically, during the GFC... The Aussie banks are far
stricter now about their lending. You see how they’ve proactively
met and exceeded regulatory requirements in the last few years…
last year, for example, they just all unilaterally, without any push
from the Reserve Bank or anyone, stopped lending to offshore in-
vestors” (Municipal Chief Economist).
“Auckland households are extremely highly geared and in many
cases are right at the limit of what they can service, even at these
historically low interest rate levels. So any kind of international
shock that sends interest rates up here–and we're are obviously
dependent on the international market to set our rate–will have
pretty serious impacts for our poor old housing market” (Senior
Consultant A).
5. The shaping of resilient responses
Turning to how and with what implications, definitional and con-
ceptual issues were identified as an issue by some actors and agencies
involved with considering the resilience of housing markets. This
framing of risk is an important issue for designing policies to increase
economic resilience or shape housing markets, and helps illustrate on-
going political considerations regarding resilience from what, how, and
for whom? This was further complicated by the subjective nature of
economics where, for example, bank economists were divided on even
such fundamental issues such as whether the economy is slowing or
accelerating. This underlying uncertainty and hidden selectivity is
highlighted by these quotes:
“How do you measure its ability to bounce back? Is it things like
property prices remain constant, don't fall away as sharply? Is it the
unemployment rate doesn't rise as rapidly as other countries? Or the
stock market falls by a smaller amount. These are all different ways
you could measure GDP growth… If a house is just a commodity
then measuring house price rebounds is not the right measure… [is
it the] resilience of certain public institutional level government or
central government rather than the individuals within it or their
employment?” (Municipal Chief Economist).
“New Zealand’s regulatory approach is very market oriented. There
is very strong focus throughout the entire framework on consumer
and investor responsibility… What that means specifically is there is
no specific objective here, for instance, to say that the Reserve Bank
or financial regulators should prevent financial loss, or banks from
failing… There is no objective to manage institutional soundness,
and no consumer protection aspects” (Senior Treasury Official(s)).
These examples underscore how there are no agreed economic resi-
lience objectives in New Zealand. In the absence of this central direction we
can see that a conventional financial framing and siloed logic was typically
pursued, such as by promoting market and individual responsibility or by
institutionally based stress tests to provide evidence of their ability to cope
(e.g. Thomas, 2013). However, the IMF recently cautioned that these po-
licies, which ostensibly are designed to increase resilience, have had limited
effects and; “do not seem to have prevented a continuous deterioration of
borrower households’ vulnerability against debt servicing capacity risks,
such as higher interest rates or income shocks” (IMF – International
Monetary Fund, 2017). Further, as with all decision support tools or
bounded tests of this nature, key questions remain with regard to what is
included or not, with difficult to quantify effects, such as those relating to
the wider economy, potentially not included (Boldyrev and Svetlova, 2016).
The tendency to measure risks in this way inevitably lends itself to siloed
stability resilience approaches.
A similarly orthodox financial framing and interpretation was
visible elsewhere. For example, one resilience strategy mooted was to
‘diversify the portfolio’ by increasing overall overseas investment. Or
the approach suggested that we need new financial products to increase
the ability to get on the property ladder. Reflecting on the discussion so
far, these may seem unusual tactics that are in conflict with the ex-
perience of the GFC, as increasing exposure to international markets
could make New Zealand less resilient, not more, while more debt may
increase risk exposure. In these interpretations we see risk and resi-
lience being simultaneously exposed, hedged and redistributed via the
housing market. For example:
“if you change the game and you go truly international with your
financing strategy and you do it at a scale that is attractive to global
markets, then you've got a much bigger pool and therefore a much
greater resilience of your financing options” (Infrastructure Council
Executive).
Turning to the cascading effects of these policies on practice, the
institutional tensions between scale, sectors, and stakeholders becomes
increasingly apparent. Here, the lessons from the GFC and the sub-
sequent recovery illuminate how some groups are more privileged in
economic resilience policy than others. For example, those who were
employed in a professional sector and those who already owned
mortgages benefitted financially from the fall in interest rates that the
GFC recovery brought. Conversely, the drop in overseas buying power
meant that manufacturing, retail, and lower wage industries experi-
enced a slowdown. A further quote illustrates the selectivity and politics
in determining the beneficiaries of existing resilience policies that are
designed to maintain the status quo in the economy and protect those
who have invested in the housing market:
“So, here’s the GFC and you suddenly see a massive improvement in
housing affordability. That’s because the median income didn't drop
very far [but] interest rates plummeted... So the ability to repay
your mortgage actually dramatically improved… the primary im-
pact here was exports [and] the industries that lost out were things
like manufacturing, retail… These were people that probably wer-
en't homeowners anyway, or less likely to be on that median wage
and therefore buying a home…. Anyone in professional services was
doing really quite well” (Municipal Chief Economist).
The issue of debt in the housing market is also useful in illustrating the
effects of resilience strategies, as risk has been transferred between stake-
holders in line with government fiscal policy while remaining on a similar
scale. Although there is a clear objective to promote selected institutional
stability via low central government debt (Rutherford, 2018) or Local Au-
thority debt caps, this still leaves other sectors and groups exposed to
housing market shock and is also to the detriment of future development
reward and therefore may weaken long-term resilience. To underscore this
trade-off interviewees identify how the type of debt has shifted from public
to private, but exposure to a wider financial shock remains.
“We have a high debt in the private side, but funnily enough if you
look back over history, the debts have just spun from public to
private. The overall debt levels per head of population from possibly
the mid ‘80 s hasn’t changed too much” (Economic Development
Executive).
“I guess that structures that promote fiscal stability amongst coun-
cils, like not limiting how much debt they can take on, or any of the
fiscal limits, would help to promote resilience, even though they
definitely are left quite high and dry in the event of a massive
housing price shock” (Senior Treasury Official).
We can now see that economic risk is largely framed as relating to
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foreign banking practices, the economic dependence on housing, and
domestic ownership of debt. We have also found that ‘who’ is de-
termining resilience in relation to the economy is mostly orchestrated
on an institutional basis using a stability logic by those that shape the
fiscal rules and housing market (e.g. governments), rather than those
that internally operate within it (e.g. residents and developers). This
means that while there may be broad agreement of the need to be re-
silient, dominant agents and institutions in the housing market may
weaken, strengthen or redistribute resilience in the economy dependent
upon their own overarching objectives.
6. Economic resilience as stability from systemic risk
By analysing the framing and application of resilience as an orga-
nising concept to influence both housing markets and the wider
economy, we can clearly see its attraction and its limits. The housing
market can be hugely important to domestic economic success and
benefits from easy rapid transfer of capital across national boundaries.
It is a market that is tailor-made for a resilience approach, being
complex, uncertain, and operating outside the scope and reach of much
traditional control mechanisms (Bristow and Healy, 2015). The way
that this has become manifest in practice adds to our understanding of
the concept and helps reveal the inherent political tensions and se-
lectivities. The data argues that while resilience is clearly accepted as
an objective, not only is there no consensus over what that should en-
tail, but there is little discussion concerning how you would you know
whether it was achieved. It is, as has been previously claimed in the
literature, taken as a self-evident goal (Jacobs and Malpas, 2017). This
ambiguity may also affect the dimension of resilience that is pursued by
key agencies. Despite the claim from then Prime Minister Bill English
(2015) that the best thing to do for the economy is: “to improve its
resilience–its capacity to adapt”, in practice there is little evidence of
adaptation, with instead a strong focus on enabling institutional stabi-
lity to cope with economic shock. As has been claimed elsewhere (e.g.
White and O’Hare, 2014), without strong direction there is a tendency
for resilience strategies to be stability oriented to underpin the existing
structures and agency of decision-making.
In the literature we referred to the shaping power of neoliberalism,
in particular the way that governments may promote resilience to avoid
changing systemic risks and shift responsibility to cope onto people and
communities (Brenner et al., 2012). The data here, however, reveals
that this responsibilisation is cascading. For example, on a national
scale, we can see how debt levels may be consistent historically, but
that this has been reduced at the centre, and typically expanded in the
local government sector and on individuals who are responsible for
their own lending practices. The risk is transferred, and so the need to
be resilient is also, but given the power and agency imbalances the only
real response is self-organisation to increase the ability to cope. Moving
upwards in scale, we can see that given the size of New Zealand the
nation has essentially been ‘responsibilised’ by Australian banking and
regulatory practices, who operate according to their own needs. In turn,
given their own problems with regard to managing flows of global risk
they may be responsibilised by global actors, international markets, or
flows of capital from Asia or elsewhere (Murphy, 2011). Or in short, the
dominant Western neoliberal financial model.
This leads to a further strand of critical discussion regarding the
ways that these dominant framings create certain post-political opera-
tional modalities, which overwhelmingly focus on the structures and
functionality of an institutional economic system, with limited space for
politics and contestation concerning the impact of this neoliberal
growth agenda (Cote and Nightingale, 2012). More generally, we can
see how resilience practice supports speculation, whether by in-
dividuals within their own city, or by financial institutions from across
the globe. By positioning the world as complex and uncertain, and re-
silience as a means to cope with, and adapt to, these unpredictable
stressors, it has a governmentality purpose that masks the political
choices inherent in the ways that capital accumulation or neoliberalism
may help generate shocks (Brenner et al., 2012).
In these circumstances we can better appreciate how and why the
methods and strategies employed have been influenced by long-
standing institutional and regulatory logics. For example, there is a
desire to work with the market, to help foster good risk behaviours, or
to slightly alter fiscal aspects, such as reducing national debt or in-
creasing cash reserves in the sector. Considering the last decade of
policies, a siloed approach has been evident, where risk is maintained,
but redistributed. That said, from a regulatory or institutional per-
spective you can appreciate why interviewees had a strong view that
resilience had increased. From a stability and regulatory perspective, it
had. But questions of implications and resilience ‘for whom’ now come
to the fore.
Reflecting on economic resilience policies following the last GFC,
we can see that there is significant unfairness. In New Zealand an
economic risk emerging from the housing market tended to affect those
who were on a lower wage who didn’t even own their own homes
(Johnson et al., 2018). The post-GFC employment statistics are also
illuminating: unemployment rose among young people, Pasifika and
Maori ethnic groups. In contrast, the employment rate of 60–64 year
olds rose from 42% in 2000 to 74% in 2017 (Maré, 2018). Of course,
people who were both young and in lower wage jobs may have suffered
intersecting disadvantages. More generally, the political focus on en-
abling the financialization of housing, such as by taxation and legisla-
tion incentives, has created an unaffordability problem for those who
do not own property (Dorling, 2014; Aalbers, 2016). So strategies that
have been designed to enable economic resilience to the risk from the
Auckland housing market have tended to promote financial resilience
for property investors and owners over more disadvantaged members of
society.
This raises important questions for fairness and equity, not just with
regards to housing markets, but with regard to where economic risks
are transferred to. Resilience discourses have essentially been framed in
a manner which conforms to the requirements of existing hegemonic
power relations, leaving those elements which may threatens these
norms positioned outside of its framings (Peck, 2010). By not ac-
counting for power and agency, managing for resilience runs the risk of
reproducing inequality and domination, with stability and persistence
much more common than transformation. This is related to ideology
and the ways in which different groups frame and reinterpret the re-
silience concept in ways that are linked to their own interests (Smith
and Stirling, 2010). For example, extending the financial ladder to
provide more access to credit is seen as a way to provide economic
resilience, as it was perceived that people would be more resilient if
they have a mortgage. Or by extending the financial ladder by pro-
viding more capital options for occupiers, so that they can staircase
from rental to ownership. There is a degree of institutional self-interest
visible, and an ability of political interest groups to co-opt a further
financial liberalization and tax reform agenda (Wilson and
Swyngedouw, 2014), one that conform to existing arrangements rather
than promote alternative systems and outcomes. Again, it is a type of
‘failing forward’ where contradictions are visible as we try to become
more resilient to a financial crisis by increasing access to global finance
and the housing market (Peck, 2010).
While there are benefits to some from this policy articulation of
resilience as ‘engineered’ stability, in the next section we discuss the
possibility of a complimentary transformational approach by focusing
on the balance of the economy and the overall exposure to systemic risk
presented by housing markets.
7. Economic resilience as transformation away from systemic risk
While the main focus of this article is to provide a critique and
analysis of current practice rather than design alternative policies,
nevertheless some discussion of this nature is necessary. It is evident
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that while economic risks stemming from housing markets are sub-
stantial, resilience policies are partial and selective. There will always
be a need for stability and a degree of trade-offs, and by drawing upon
resilience theory we can bring these limits to light and help open up
new discourses about the need and potential for more transformative
policies. In simple terms this requires an expansion in focus from in-
stitutions and regulation to also consider the balance of an economy
and the wider forces that create and reproduce housing markets.
If resilience focused on adaptation or transformation is an aim, then
national policies that reduce exposure to systemic risks would be
needed. Taking a political-economy perspective we can see that the
focus on stability in economic resilience policy doesn’t recognise the
crisis prone nature of capitalism; risks will always be taken, businesses
will always fail, debt will be ever present. Indeed, this is a fundamental
basis of how markets operate. It is in the very nature of capitalism for
this to occur. Moreover, given the strong connection of the Auckland
housing market to flows of global capital, debt, and speculative activity
the market is inevitably exposed. Resilience in the context of fostering a
‘safe’ or ‘stable’ system is therefore an impossibility over the long-term.
In simple terms we need to move from ‘fail-safe’ to ‘safe-to-fail’, where
risks are reduced, manageable and equitably redirected towards risk-
takers.
Transformational practices of this nature require significant direc-
tion and coordination however, in part as they may require changes to
existing power structures and institutions, and involve an array of fiscal
or policy levers across various public policy arenas. The initial stage
would be to reflect on the extent to which the overall exposure of the
Auckland housing market to systemic risk taking and the unpredictable
flows of global finance is desirable. The lesson from the last GFC is that
countries whose markets were more exposed to private capital were
more vulnerable to economic shock (Van der Heijden et al., 2011), but
there is no doubt that some risk can ring economic growth. This would
also involve reflecting on the balance of an economy and more fine
grained work researching context and place specific risks that will differ
from region to region. Essentially this is a shift from a one-size-fits-all
institutional monetary focus to recognise the complex way markets
operate and can be reconfigured. For example, this may include a re-
silient framework that is agile enough to incorporate housing market
price fluctuations both positive and negative; sophisticated in multi-
scalar approaches to consider housing markets that are sensitive to the
heterogeneous and global characteristic of housing; and ideologically
detached enough to conceive a multi-sector that can accommodate
public and private (and 3rd sector) collaborations to address inelastic
land supply and the ability to transport (human, natural and capital)
resources between spaces – and as example, opening the way for more
balanced land value capture that a dominant housing market could
redistribute and rebalance. The shaping of housing markets by in-
stitutional good practice and learning could also make resilience in the
wider economy more akin to institutional complexities and evolu-
tionary progression rather than attempting to maintain an equilibrium.
Stability is part of a resilience strategy, but it only reflects a narrow
range of options available to reduce exposure for nations.
By researching questions connected to resilience from what, for
whom and how, we can appreciate the hidden politics at play, both
within nation states, and at a global scale. The promise and rhetorical
power of the concept translate into practice in an uneven and unfair
manner, with systemic risk largely untouched and persistence of capital
gaining actors and practices privileged. The tools and approaches cur-
rently adopted can only affect the housing market in a limited fashion
and by opening up these limitations we hope to stimulate wider debate
on the practical utility of resilience and how we may cope, adapt and
transform in response to economic shock.
8. Conclusion
Housing markets are at the forefront of global capital seeking
activities, they are hugely important for national economies, and, given
the international interconnectedness and potential for shock, they have
been closely associated with the resilience discourse. The research
supports other critiques that identify the difficulties in operationalising
‘fuzzy concepts’ such as resilience. Findings show that ‘how’ and ‘for
whom’ resilience in the economy is formed in relation to housing
markets is a matter of power and agency. In the absence of strong di-
rection, resilience framing was found to be shaped by existing institu-
tional and professional logics. While the risk to the economy associated
with housing markets has a pervasive effect, in practice resilience
policy served to underpin the dominant political economy, the stability
of selected institutions, and to a certain extent, existing homeowners
and speculative investors. There is no real evidence of seeking to
transition away from this systemic risk and instead policies essentially
redistribute risk, and by extension resilience, between stakeholders,
scales and times in an uneven and hidden manner.
With regard to the housing market, this brings into focus issues
connected to resilience for whom. There is a zero-sum nature to much
policy with resilience both strengthened and weakened depending upon
how the issue is framed and who or what is deemed in need of pro-
tection. While institutions are now able to cope with shock and stress
better, highly leveraged individuals may not be. The reality is that by
designing policies that enable the housing market to continue to per-
form as a highly productive asset class for global finance and others
with access to capital, it privileges owners over non-owners, and
housing speculators over those in retail or manufacturing sectors who
may suffer from the knock-on effects of another GFC. As such, it appears
the resilience of the housing market is merely a reproduction of poli-
tical dominance dependent on economic circumstances. Critically, the
broad housing market that underpins crises in the economy escapes
much attention, risk is cascaded over scale in a largely opaque manner,
and the emphasis is put on the ability to self-organise and cope with
shock better, such as by raising capital reserves or by macro-prudential
measures.
We therefore put forward concern on the extent to which the con-
cept of resilience is useful applied in this way, beyond reactively pro-
viding a regulatory tweak or a cash buffer. The rhetoric has an active,
reassuring quality that promotes economic confidence in the face of
uncertain shock, and its value may be more political than practical. This
puts a framing of resilience in practice as one that serves existing risk
taking ideologies, with stakeholders with power and agency accepting
the potential for long-term economic shock as an acceptable corollary
of the shorter-term capital generating potential of housing as an asset
class. We see the effects of this beyond a continuation of the current
system however, as the focus of policy is largely on protecting those
who take the risks, rather than those who don’t. Put differently, re-
flecting on the way resilience has been mobilised as an organising
concept, economic risk stemming from agents and institutions shaping
the housing system have themselves proved resilient to change.
More encouraging for this study, in revealing these difficulties we
see some opportunities for clarity amidst the fog of practical operations
and political expediency when considering economic resilience in the
context of a dominant housing market. A move towards an alternative
multi-dimensional framework that adds transformation to stability is
recommended. This approach would recognise the complexity of mar-
kets and the differences between regions and the need to rebalance
economic exposure in a more fine-grained fashion. It would also need
clear national objectives that coordinate between sectors and scales,
aspects which are currently not part of the resilient discourse, but we
hope will be.
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